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INTRODUCTION

SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.' The term was coined in 1988 by two University of Denver professors,
George W. Pring, Professor of Law, and Penelope Canan, Professor of
Sociology.2 Pring and Canan created the term in connection with a ten-year
interdisciplinary study.' The term is most often defined by the paradigm
case in which a meritless4 defamation5 lawsuit is filed by a business entity

* Editor's Note: This article received the Alice Irish Williams Award for best seminar
paper in Spring 1997.
1. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989).
2. The term first appeared in 1988 in two articles jointly written by Professors George
W. Pring and Penelope Canan. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation:Mixing Quantitative and QualitativeApproaches, 22
L. & Soc'Y REv. 385 (1988) [hereinafter Canan & Pring, L. & Soc'y REV.]; Penelope Canan
& George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,35 SOC. PROBS. 506
(1988) [hereinafter Canan & Pring, Soc. PROBs.].
3. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT
2, 209 (1996). The study was entitled the Political Litigation Project [hereinafter Pring/Canan
Study] and was jointly undertaken by the Department of Sociology and the College of Law
at the University of Denver. PRING & CANAN, supra at 209-22 (describing the study
methodology and specific findings). The study was funded by the University of Denver, the
Hughes Research and Development Fund, and by a grant from the National Science
Foundation. Id. at 209.
4. See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs,
26 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 395, 399 (1993); Jeffrey A. Benson et al., Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation(SLAPPs): An Overview, C750 A.L,I./A.B.A. 837, 840 (1992); Edmond
Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPPISLAPPBACK: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political
Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 423 (1991); Pring, supra note 1,
at 8; Jennifer E. Sills, SLAPPS (StrategicLawsuits Against Public Participation):How Can
the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 547, 548 (1993); cf. David J.
Abell, Comment, Exercise of Constitutional Privileges: Deterring Abuse of the First
Amendment - "StrategicLawsuits Against PoliticalParticipation,"47 SMU L. REv. 95, 98
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against an ordinary citizen 6 who, on public interest grounds has opposed the
entity in a local government proceeding. For example, a developer sues a
local resident who opposes zoning-board approval for the developer's
construction project in an effort to intimidate and silence the citizen. What
is unclear is whether, given the small size of the Pring/Canan Study database,
this problem constitutes a "litigation explosion" as Pring and Canan have
consistently claimed.7 What is clear, however, is that the conclusions of the
Pring/Canan Study have inspired an explosion of publicity in professional
and academic journals, in popular magazines and newspapers, and even on
television.8
The use of the paradigm case to frame the terms of the debate is one of
the distinguishing features of the SLAPP literature.9 The paradigm case has
(1993) ("Proposed solutions to the SLAPP problem must weigh the interests of the petitioning
citizen as well as those parties legitimately filing a cause of action . . . ."); Mamie Stetson,
Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York Anti-SLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1327
(1995) ("Anti-SLAPP solutions must therefore balance and protect the activist's right to
petition the government with the right of a presumptively legitimate plaintiff to seek redress
through the courts.").
5. Although many different causes of action appeared in the Pring/Canan Study cases,
defamation was by far the most common. Defamation was a cause of action in 53% of the
cases. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 217. The second most common cause of action,
"business torts," is actually a category containing multiple causes of action; even so it is still
only slightly more than half as common as defamation, appearing as a cause of action in 33%
of the cases. Id. Other causes of action lag far behind defamation in popularity: Process
violation (e.g., abuse of process) was a cause of action in 19%, conspiracy in 18%, and
"constitutional/civil rights" in 17% of the cases. Id. Also, defamation is a cause of action
that, as it is currently litigated, gives the appearance of being particularly well-suited as a
means of harassment. An eminent defamation law scholar recently concluded that "the present
law [of defamation] works pretty well for the most influential members of the media
community, though poorly for nearly everyone else." David Anderson, Who Needs Libel
Reform?, 338 P.L.I./PAT. 639, 641 (1992). He continued, "[T]he law that protects media so
well from ultimate judgments protects poorly against harassment .... It fails to discourage
the filing of libel suits for intimidation .... It invites extensive discovery which multiplies
the potential for harassment." Id. at 642. Another commentator observed, "One would be
hardpressed to find another area of the law in which so overwhelming a proportion of
defendants brought into court are eventually vindicated." Costantini & Nash, supra note 4,
at 420.
6. SLAPP defendants typically are referred to as "ordinary citizens" although, in fact,
the typical SLAPP plaintiff is demographically indistinguishable from the typical SLAPP
defendant. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
8. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 225 n.21 (documenting the proliferation of
publicity about this alleged litigation explosion and listing law and sociology journal articles
on SLAPPs); id. at 226 n.22 (listing articles on SLAPPs in popular newspapers and magazines
such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,USA Today, Newsweek Woman Day,
Playboy and Sports Illustrated); id. at 226 n.23 (listing television shows that have mentioned
or discussed SLAPPs, such as 20/20 and LA Law).
9. E.g., Abell, supra note 4, at 95, 109 ("The Beverly Hills League of Women Voters,
exercising their First Amendment Rights, wrote letters . . . expressing opposition to a
condominium development .... The most typical SLAPP suit involves a developer plaintiff
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infused the SLAPP literature with a sense of social outrage. It also may have
obscured and disparaged other interests vitally implicated in the debate, for
example, the interests of the plaintiff who seeks redress in good faith for a
genuine reputational wrong but whose case unfortunately resembles the
paradigm SLAPP. The fact that the interests of the good-faith plaintiff may
be ignored or prejudicially mischaracterized when associated with the term
"SLAPP" makes the increasingly promiscuous use of the term by courts 10
and legislators" a matter of serious concern.
Part II of this article examines the empirical basis for the conclusions of
Pring and Canan. This part reexamines the data collected in their ten-year
study and questions whether the data is adequate to support the study's
suing a group of citizens who oppose the development."); Barker, supra note 4, at 396 ("To
illustrate, a classic scenario pits a real estate developer against a neighborhood group opposed
to a particular development."); Alice Glover & Marcus Jimison, SLAPP Suits: A First
Amendment Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122, 124-25 (1995) ("A prototypical and
often cited illustration of a SLAPP suit centers on the case of a developer who invests time
and money into drafting plans for a tract of land to be developed .... [S]ome members of the
public, often neighbors of the undeveloped land, become concerned over general environmental and health issues. They begin to actively participate by writing letters to the media or
involving themselves in governmental hearings to express these concerns."); Mary Caroline
Lee, The Conflict Between "FairHousing" and Free Speech, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1223, 1223 (1996) ("Imagine that you own a home in a quiet residential area. One day a
neighbor tells you that the local fair housing advocacy group is planning to establish a group
home for recovering substance abusers on your street You are understandably concerned.
. . ."); Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 48
("When Nancy Hsu Fleming emigrated to the United States from Taiwan more than 25 years
ago, she never imagined she could get hauled into court for exercising her constitutional
rights."); PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 4 ("Betty Johnson scarcely viewed herself as
politically active - she was, in her own words, 'just a housewife' - the night she attended
her first city planning commission meeting ....");Sills, supra note 4, at 547 ("Imagine the
following scenario. A developer plans to build over one hundred luxury condominiums on
a hillside in the town of Pleasantville.. . . Mrs. Jones, a citizen of Pleasantville, is concerned
....");Stetson, supra note 4, at 1324, 1328 ("A developer proposes a subdivision in an area
of a community ... and much of the community opposes the change, spurring the creation
In the paradigmatic
of an ad hoc group of local citizens called Protect Our Town. ...
SLAPP, the developer claims that the activist has purposefully damaged the developer's
reputation while the activist argues that the suit is an attempt to silence and punish the activist
for opposing the developer's project."); Thomas A. Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in
FirstAmendment Law and in the Courts' Responses to FrivolousLitigation, 39 UCLA L. REV.
979, 981 (1992) ("Joann Snyder and Paula Wells visited the Brownsville Golden Age Nursing
Home in Pennsylvania, hoping to find a place that would care for an elderly relative.. . . The
most typical SLAPP suit finds a developer plaintiff suing environmental activists who have
opposed a development project.").
10. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 224 n.20 (listing over 20 reported cases that
use the term "SLAPP").
11. Nine states have passed legislation aimed at curtailing SLAPPs: California, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington.
PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 189. AntiSLAPP legislation has been proposed in several
additional states including Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
Id.
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conclusions. Part III examines the constitutional argument that has come to
dominate the legal literature on SLAPPs. This argument finds an absolute
privilege under the Petition Clause for communications made in a genuine
attempt to influence government action. This part analyzes the sparse
Petition Clause caselaw and finds that the Petition Clause confers no greater
protection than do other First Amendment rights. In the context of
defamation, the article concludes that the right to petition, like the right of
free speech, is protected by the balance of rights embodied in the New York
Times v. Sullivan 2 standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. THE PRING/CANAN STUDY
Pring and Canan claim to have discovered the existence of a "litigation
explosion,"' 3 "[a] new breed of lawsuits [that] is stalking America."' 4
They have concluded that ordinary citizens concerned about local public
issues are being "sued into silence"' 5 "by the thousands"' 6 "simply for
exercising one of our most cherished constitutional rights - 'speaking out'
on political issues."' 7 Pring and Canan discuss the constitutional implications of their conclusions. 8 They warn that this litigation explosion offers
an ominous message for every American, because SLAPPs threaten
the very future of "citizen involvement" or "public participation" in
government, long viewed as essential in our representative democracy.
The real value at stake is, quite simply, whether our nation
will continue to encourage, to protect, and to be9 a government "of
the people, by the people, and for the people."'1
These inflammatory conclusions, however, must be viewed with caution.
The claim of Pring and Canan that thousands of SLAPPs occur each year
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
13. George W. Pring & Penelope A. Canan, SLAPPs: An Overview of the Practice,C935
A.L.I./A.B.A. 1, 3 (1994).
14. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 1.
15. Id.at 3.
16. Id.;
Penelope Canan, The SLAPPfrom a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENvTL. L.
REv. 23 (1989); Canan & Pring, L. & Soc'Y REv., supra note 2, at 385; Canan & Pring, SOC.
PROBS., supra note 2, at 506; Pring, supra note 1, at 4; Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 3;
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation "
("SLAPPS"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 937,
938 (1992) [hereinafter Strategic Lawsuits].
17. Pring & Canan, Strategic Lawsuits, supra note 16, at 938.
18. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 28-29.
19. Id.
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may be based on an inadequate sample. The research that supported their
first articles, which formed the empirical basis for the subsequent explosion
of SLAPP literature, was based on a database of only 100 cases. 20 After ten
years of additional research, during which the Pring/Canan Study received
great popular, as well as scholarly, attention,2' they had uncovered only 141
additional cases.22
Additional analysis by independent experts in empirical research
methodology is needed to determine the scientific validity of the Pring/Canan
Study. Pring and Canan have extrapolated from the discovery of 241 cases
over a ten-year period the existence of thousands of cases each year. To
justify this sizable leap, they offer only that additional cases are difficult to
identify because there is no central repository or reporting mechanism for
lawsuits that are filed and disposed of in lower state trial courts. 23 Pring
and Canan claim, without any explanation of the scientific basis for their
conclusion, that "the hundreds of SLAPPs ... [that they] have studied
provide a body of data sufficiently comprehensive and diverse to permit
[them]... to understand the landscape of the problem and know its contours
with a high level of confidence. 24 Unfortunately, this conclusion is not
self-supporting, given that "hundreds" is, in fact, only 241 cases.
Additional analysis also is necessary to determine the validity of the
methods used to collect their data. Although data collected directly from the
parties in the cases is material to the study's conclusions, such data was
collected in only about half the cases.2" The data that was collected may
26
have skewed the study because it came predominantly from defendants.
Out of the 241 cases studied, Pring and Canan reached only half as many
plaintiffs as defendants,27 were unable to contact anyone connected with
almost half of the cases, 28 and could not use eight of the cases because they

20. The original 1988 study was based on 100 cases. Pring, supra note 1, at 4. By 1992,
the study included 228 cases, Pring & Canan, StrategicLawsuits, supra note 16, at 944 n. 17.
By 1994, the study had expanded to include 238 cases. Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 3.
By 1996, the study included 241 cases. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 210. The cases
studied were "virtually all" filed after 1958, although "most" cases were filed after 1970. Id.
The Pring/Canan Study began in 1984. Id. at 209.
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
22. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 211.
23. Id. at 266 n.16; Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 23 n.59.
24. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 210; see Pring & Canan, supranote 13, at 23 n.59.
25. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 211. In 110 of the cases, Pring and Canan were
unable to contact any of the disputants. Id. at 267 n.23.
26. Id. at 211.
27. Id. By the end of their ten-year study, the researchers were able to contact only 104
defendants and a mere 51 plaintiffs. Id.
28. 1d. at 267 n.23 (110 of the cases).
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remained pending.29 This possible skew in the data is not addressed by
Pring and Canan.
Party bias also may have been injected into the study. Pring and Canan
presented defendants with a series of vignettes.3" The vignettes were used
to measure the defendants' present willingness to exercise their constitutional
rights.3" They presented hypothetical cases such as that of "CATHY" who
has "a CIVIC interest" in the efforts of "KEYSTONE INC.. . . to REZONE
RURAL LAND IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A SHOPPING CENTER. 32
The vignettes ended with a question about how each defendant would "advise
33
Cathy.
Of course, these vignettes were likely to remind the defendants of their
own cases. The defendants had been selected for the original study precisely
because of the similarities between the SLAPP paradigm case, which was
presented in the vignettes, and their own cases.34 A defendant in a lawsuit
is already likely to have negative perceptions about being sued. The
vignettes, therefore, may have unnecessarily invoked negative and resentful
responses. Such vignettes may have encouraged defendants to characterize
the claims of those who sued them as meritless, unjust, and oppressive, as
much as, or more than, the vignettes measured the defendants' present
willingness to exercise their constitutional rights.
It also is problematic that Pring and Canan compared each defendant's
vignette responses only with those of other persons selected by the defendant.35 The purpose of this comparison was to ascertain whether the
defendant's willingness to exercise the defendant's own constitutional rights
had been chilled by the alleged SLAPP when compared to the willingness of
a similarly situated person who has not been sued.36 Persons who were
identified by the defendant as similarly situated may or may not, in fact, have
been similarly situated. The defendant's identification of similarly situated
persons may have been aspirational. It is not unlikely that a person whom
a defendant aspirationallyidentifies as similar to himself would be more
willing than the defendant to exercise his constitutional rights or more willing

29. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 267 n.23. One wonders why, if these cases were
not used at all, they were counted as part of the database.
30. Id.at 211.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

35. Each defendant was asked to select the members of two control groups: those from
the defendant's geographic area who were not defendants but were "comparably/contemporaneously politically active citizens" and who (1) had heard about a defendant's
case ("Ripple Effects"); or (2) had not heard about the defendant's case ("Untouchables").

Id.
36. Id.
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than the defendant to attribute to himself such a willingness. Thus, any
difference between the defendant and his chosen control group as to a selfreported willingness to exercise constitutional rights may not be reliably
attributed to the alleged SLAPP. The claims of Pring and Canan to have
scientifically measured a chilling effect that is specifically attributable to
SLAPPs, therefore, must be viewed with caution.
The term "SLAPP" was designed to describe the scope of the
Pring/Canan Study.37 The term was defined by Pring and Canan as: a (1)
a civil lawsuit, whether in a complaint or a counterclaim, (2) that is "used to
attack ... Petition Clause 3 -protected activities"3 9 (3) filed against private
citizens, not public officials or government employees, (4) on a substantive
not a political issue, such as those surrounding campaigns for elected office,
(5) of "public interest or social significance"4 rather than on an issue
involving only personal advantage. 4' Pring and Canan expressly rejected the
notion that the identification of a SLAPP depends on any determination of
the plaintiff's intent or motive.42 They assert that their definition "avoids
subjective judgments about 'motives' or 'intent.' ,43
Ironically, the SLAPP literature abounds with judgmental statements
about the intent of plaintiffs. 44 Some commentators go so far as to suggest

37. Id. at 210.
38. The Petition Clause is part of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is the
right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
39. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 9.
40. Id.
41. The researchers' definition of the term SLAPP is fully described in PRING & CANAN,
supra note 3, at 8-9.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Abell, supra note 4, at 109 ("SLAPP plaintiffs use tort law to punish citizens
for exercising their constitutional right to speak and petition the government."); Barker, supra
note 4, at 403, 406 ("By definition, SLAPP plaintiffs have improper motives.... A SLAPP
plaintiff's primary motive is to chill a defendant's speech or protest activity and to discourage
opposition by others.... SLAPP plaintiffs do not intend to win the litigation.... Rather,
they seek to silence their critics . . . ."); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and
Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 105 (1988) ("(T]he goal
[of SLAPPs] is to retaliate against public interest spokesmen and to discourage them from
further activism."); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 423-24 ("SLAPPs are legally meritless
suits designed, from their inception, to intimidate and harass political critics into silence and
not to achieve the purposes for which libel law exists, i.e., the restoration of falsely damaged
reputations and compensation for the damage done."); Glover & Jimison, supra note 9, at 122,
128 ("[The SLAPP plaintiff] wishes to stifle the expressions of another.... [T]he litigation
is primarily instituted as a strategic move to intimidate that party into silence. . . . The
motivations of a SLAPP plaintiff include retaliation,. . . attempts to silence and intimidate
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that it is the plaintiff's motive alone that defines a SLAPP suit.45 Despite
their own assertions to the contrary, Pring and Canan themselves often slip
into subjective judgments about plaintiffs' motives.46 They refer to "making47
SLAPPers pay for their attacks on citizens and the democratic process,"'
and to defendants as "targets ' 48 and "victims. ' '49 They often offer definitions of SLAPP that hinge on the plaintiff's motive: (1) "SLAPPs are filed
by one side of a public, political dispute to punish or prevent opposing points
of view";50 (2) SLAPPs are "aimed at preventing citizens from exercising
their political rights or punishing those who have done so"; ' and (3)
SLAPPs are merely "tactics to drain the resources, commitment, and
vocabulary of political debate,. . . a creative means for ideologically warring
against egalitarian principles of citizen participation"5 2 that threatens "our
entire concept of a participatory democracy."53 Pring and Canan purport to
have determined the attitudes of SLAPP plaintiffs, not only to SLAPPs, but
also in general. They claim that SLAPP plaintiffs' "attitudes are conceptually similar to political intolerance"54 because they are "'willing[] to restrict

the defendants ... , and offensive strategy to prevent others from opposing the plaintiff's
plans."); Waldman, supra, note 9, at 981-82 ("SLAPP plaintiffs use tort law to punish activists
for exercising the constitutional right to speak and petition the government for redress of
grievances."). Later in the article, however, Waldman suggests that SLAPP plaintiffs may
sometimes file their suits for legitimate reasons:
SLAPP plaintiffs are motivated to sue for three reasons. The first, and most
legitimate reason, is to file a tort claim for reasons independent from any strategy
to suppress the speech or petitioning of the defendant, but which incidentally has
that effect. A second, less legitimate motivation, is to file a potentially meritorious
suit, with a subsidiary purpose of discouraging or penalizing political participation.
The third, illegitimate, motivation is to retaliate against political participation.
Id. at 985.
45. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 4, at 401 ("Solutions for SLAPPs 'must focus solely on
the SLAPP plaintiff's motive in suing, not the defendant's objective in petitioning.' " (quoting
Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:An Analysis
of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 401 (1991)); Laura J. Ericson-Siegel, Review of
Florida Legislation; Comment: Silencing SLAPPs: An Examination of Proposed Legislative
Remedies and a 'Solution 'for Florida, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 492 (1992) ("Generally,
it will not be obvious from the face of the pleadings whether a suit is truly a SLAPP because
it is the motives behind the filing of the suit that determines its character.") (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Canan, supra note 16, at 30; Pring, supra note 1, at 4 (describing SLAPPs
as lawsuits that are filed in order to "stop citizens from exercising their political rights or to
punish them for having done so").
47. PaING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 187.
48. Id. at 9-10. Pring and Canan use the term "targets" instead of defendants. Id.
49. See, e.g., id. at 219.
50. Id. at 212.
51. Canan & Pring, SOC. PROBS., supra note 2, at 506.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 221.
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a disliked group's" democratic rights based on the content of . . . [the
group's] views.' "5657 Plaintiffs "lack ... [any] principled support for
democratic values.,
One of the most fundamental flaws in the Pring/Canan Study is this
effort to stretch the study's conclusions in order to purport to accurately
characterize the motives of SLAPP plaintiffs. This imputation of evil
motives to SLAPP plaintiffs is based on scant data from the plaintiffs
themselves.5 8 The determination of motive is a complex inquiry. Yet,
Pring and Canan collected data from only 51 of the 241 plaintiffs in their
database 59 and used a "survey" to "determine ' 6 1 party motives.2 This
paltry database is a precarious foundation indeed upon which to build a harsh
portrait of the motives of the thousands of plaintiffs who Pring and Canan
allege file SLAPPs each year.
These inadequately supported characterizations may operate to discount
the fundamental constitutional rights of SLAPP plaintiffs. A plaintiff's right
to petition is clearly implicated when that plaintiff files a lawsuit in good
faith, genuinely seeking redress for perceived wrongs. A plaintiff's right to
petition includes access to the courts.3 Yet, due to the disparaging portrait
of the motives of SLAPP plaintiffs as painted by Pring and Canan, most of
the proposed antiSLAPP solutions are little concerned with the plaintiff's
right to petition. 64
Given the harsh portrait of the motives of SLAPP plaintiffs that has been
emphatically argued by Pring and Canan, it is not surprising that many
SLAPP commentators inaccurately report that plaintiffs are wealthier than
defendants and that the typical plaintiff is a large business entity while the
typical defendant is an ordinary citizen.65 In actuality, as pointed out by

55. Presumably, the "disliked group" is the defendants.

56. Id. (quoting J.

SULLIVAN ET AL., POLmCAL TOLERANCE IN CONTEXT: SUPPORT FOR

UNPOPULAR MINORITIES IN ISRAEL, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES (1985)).

57. Id.
58. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
59. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 211.
60. Id. Pring and Canan do not explain what data was collected by the survey, how the
survey was designed to collect it, how the collected data was used to determine plaintiffs'
motives, or whether data other than that collected by the survey was used.
61. Id.
62. Id. It is difficult to understand why they were even investigating this when according
to Pring and Canan's own express definition of SLAPPs plaintiffs' motives are irrelevant.
63. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)
("'M]eaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment.").
64. See supra Part II.
65. See, e.g., Abell, supra note 4, at 97 (including in his definition of a SLAPP the
criterion that the defendant typically "suffers from an enormous inequality of resources" as
compared to the plaintiff); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 479 n.29 ("As a general matter,

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 9

Pring and Canan, there is no statistically significant difference between
plaintiffs and defendants as to income, litigation experience, education, level
of political activism, age, or gender.66 The cases studied do not present a
picture of rich, litigation-savvy plaintiffs, with lawyers constantly at their
side, versus naive, less educated folk who have never met a lawyer - far
from it. The typical plaintiff was exactly the same as the typical defendant:
"a male college graduate in his forties with an annual household income of
$40,000 - 60,000 per year."67
Because no empirical research other than the Pring/Canan Study exists
to support the explosion of legal and popular literature, court decisions, and
state legislation dealing with SLAPPs,68 this study must be rigorously
criticized as to its scientific validity. Possible inadequacies in the methodology of the study call into question the conclusions of its authors. These
conclusions attempt to identify a specific subcategory of defamation suits:
defamation suits that chill free speech when the allegedly defamatory speech
occurs in the context of legitimate petitioning activity. Although the claims
of Pring and Canan to have scientifically differentiated this alleged
subcategory of defamation cases are suspect, the chill imposed by defamation
suits in general on the free exercise of First Amendment rights is still real.
The danger of a chilling effect on defamation defendants is not the threat
of adverse judgments. SLAPP defendants, exactly like defamation defendants
in general, almost always prevail.69 The chill from defamation suits stems
SLAPP plaintiffs tend to be large firms .... "); Cosentino, supra note 45, at 402 ("SLAPPs
are generally filed by large, well-financed organizations against private citizens or local
citizens' groups .... "); Glover & Jimison, supra note 9, at 124-25 (describing the typical
defendant in a SLAPP, as distinguished from the typical plaintiff, as a private citizen); John
Hershey, Casenote: If You Can'tSay Something Nice, Can You Say Anything at All? Moldea
v. New York Times Co. and the Importanceof Context in FirstAmendment Law, 67 U. COLO.

L. REv. 705, 706 (1996) ("[S]ome public officials and corporations have filed 'SLAPPs' Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation - in an attempt to intimidate critics .... ");
Edward W. McBride, Jr., The Empire State SLAPPs Back: New York Legislative Response to

SLAPP Suits, 17 VT. L. REv. 925, 935-36 (1993) (claiming that most SLAPP plaintiffs fall
into a "discrete class").
66. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 220-21.
67. Id. at 220.

68. Id. at 209.
69. Defendants in the Pring/Canan Study won favorable legal judgments in 77% of the
cases studied as reported in 1992, Pring & Canan, supra note 16, at 944 n.17, to 83% of the
cases as reported in 1988, Canan & Pring, SOC. PROBS., supra note 2, at 514. Presumably,
the fluctuation in the percentage is a result of the small number of cases included in the study.
The study began with 100 cases and ended with 241. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. Out of this small number of cases, Pring and Canan contacted only 104 defendants
and 51 plaintiffs. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. Two-thirds of all the cases
in the study were dismissed at their very first court appearance. PRING & CANAN, supra note
3, at 218; Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 13. The other one-third, where dismissal was
denied or delayed, were most often reversed and dismissed on appeal. PamNG & CANAN,
supra note 3, at 218; Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 12. Only a "very small number"

SLAPPS

from the great amounts of time7" and money7 defendants typically expend
during the pendency of the litigation.
Any discussion of solutions to ameliorate this chill, however, should
avoid use of the term "SLAPP." The conclusions of the Pring/Canan Study,
the only empirical research that is used to support the currently accepted
inference that SLAPPs exist in significant numbers, are suspect. The extent
to which this alleged subcategory of defamation cases exists, and the extent
to which it causes a chilling effect that is distinct from that of defamation
cases in general, remains largely a matter of speculation.72
Therefore, the risk of severely prejudicing the rights of those hapless
defamation plaintiffs whose cases happen to resemble the paradigm SLAPP,
caused by the harshly disparaging portrait of their motives painted by Pring
and Canan, is currently unjustified. This unjustified risk may be avoided by
carefully limiting the use of the term "SLAPP" to the context of the study for
which it was specifically and idiosyncratically designed.
III.

SLAPPs AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION

The definition of "SLAPP" is expressly limited to lawsuits that implicate
the First Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of
grievances.73 The reason given by the researchers for this limitation is that
violations of other rights, such as the "rights of speech, press, association,
religion, equal protection, due process, on and on ...have been extensively
studied, whereas no one had empirically examined the use of lawsuits against
Clearly, the reason for this limitation
Petition Clause-protected activities.'
is the researchers' need to differentiate their study from the work of other
researchers in their field.
(Pring and Canan do not provide this number) proceeded to trial, and an even smaller number
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff that was upheld on appeal. PRING & CANAN, supra note
3, at 218; Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 12-13. These statistics are strikingly consistent
with those for defamation cases in general: seventy-five percent result in dismissals or
summary judgments for the defendant and less than ten percent are ultimately decided in the
plaintiff's favor. MARK FRANKLIN & DAVID ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 337 (1991).
70. The average duration of the cases included in the Pring/Canan Study was between 36
months, Pring & Canan, StrategicLawsuits, supra note 16, at 944 n. 17; Pring & Canan, supra
note 13, at 13, and 40 months, PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218. Less than one-third
of the cases were resolved quickly. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218. Originally, 16
months or less was the quick-resolution category. Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 13.
Although the quick-resolution category was later changed (without explanation) to 18 months
or less, PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218, the reported result, that less than one-third of
the cases fell into that category, remained constant.
71. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218.
72. See id. at 217 (Defamation is the legal claim most frequently asserted in SLAPP
cases.).
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 9.
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The researchers are legitimately entitled to limit their own study in this
way. It makes little sense, however, to use this term in the context of
constitutional debate in order to describe a subcategory of defamation cases
that is not constitutionally cognizable. It makes more sense to group all
defamation cases together for the purposes of constitutional analysis,
regardlessof whether they implicate the Petition Clause or the constitutionally co-equal - even if "extensively studied" - right of free speech.
When speech relates to an issue of public debate or concern, speech
protected by the right to petition is deserving of no more, and no less,
protection than speech protected by the right of free speech. It is difficult to
understand why the speech of a concerned citizen speaking out against a
local zoning ordinance should be more worthy of constitutional protection
than the speech of a newspaper columnist discussing national racial tensions.
As Justice Brennan wrote in McDonald v. Smith:75
There is no persuasive reason for according greater or lesser
protection to expression on matters of public importance depending
on whether the expression consists of speaking to neighbors across
the backyard fence, publishing an editorial in the local newspaper, or
sending a letter to the President of the United States. It necessarily
follows that expression falling within the scope of the Petition
Clause, while fully protected by the actual-malice standard set forth
in New York imes Co. v. Sullivan, is not shielded by an absolute
privilege.76
In McDonald,the plaintiff, Smith, sought presidential appointment to the
position of U.S. Attorney in North Carolina." The defendant, McDonald,
wrote two letters to the President and sent copies to several other federal
officials. 78 In the letters, McDonald falsely maligned Smith with immoderate invective.79 After Smith failed to get the appointment, he sued the
defendant for libel, alleging a million dollars in damages.8s The Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's denial of the defendant's motions for
judgment on the pleadings. 8' Requiring that the plaintiff prove "actual
malice,"8 2 the Court held that the right to petition does not confer an

75. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
76. Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 480-81.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 481.
80. Id. at 480-81.
81. Id. at 481-82, 485.
82. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining "actual
malice" as "with knowledge that ... [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless
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unqualified privilege to tortiously defame others any more than does the right
to free speech.83 "The right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit
libel with impunity is not.""
By including only cases that involve petitioning speech, the definition of
the term "SLAPP" attempts to separate the Petition Clause from the rest of
the First Amendment and to treat it differently. Much of the SLAPP
literature argues that when a defamation suit implicates the right to petition,
the New York limes85 balance of rights should not apply.86 There is little
justification, however, to confer favored status on the right to petition over

disregard of whether. . . [the defamatory statement] was false or not").
83. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485.
84. Id.
85. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254. New York Times conferred qualified immunity for
allegedly defamatory speech when a defamation suit is brought by a public official. In such
a case, the speaker is immune from liability unless he made the allegedly defamatory
statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not." Id. at 279-80. In Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court held
that the actual malice standard applies to both public officials and public figures; in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that some plaintiffs could be public
figures for a limited purpose, and that the actual malice standard does not apply to private
individuals unless the plaintiff seeks punitive damages and the allegedly defamatory speech
relates to a matter of public concern. In Dun & BradstreetInc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court held that the actual malice standard does not apply when the
plaintiff is a private individual and the allegedly defamatory speech relates solely to matters
of private concern. The Dun & Bradstreet Court also recognized that there is no distinction
between media defendants and nonmedia defendants in the application of the actual malice
standard. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court held that there
is no absolute privilege for opinions because the actual malice standard applies to opinions
when they reasonably imply defamatory facts that are provable as false. In Philadelphia
Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), Justice O'Connor reviewed the evolution of
the doctrine as follows:
One can discern in these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law
landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is
a public official or figure, or is instead a private figure. The second is whether the
speech at issue is of public concern. When the speech is of public concern and the
plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the
plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before recovering damages from a media
defendant than is raised by the common law. When the speech is of public concern
but the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the Constitution still supplants the
standards of the common law, but the constitutional requirements are, in at least
some of their range, less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and
the speech is of public concern. When the speech is of exclusively private concern
and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional
requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of
the common-law landscape.
Id. at 775.
86. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 15-28 (arguing that speech that is directed to
influencing the outcome of a government process should be absolutely privileged under the
Petition Clause and should not be subject to the qualified New York Times balance of rights).
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other First Amendment rights.
The basis for this argument is the doctrine commonly known as the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 87 This doctrine has developed in the area of
federal antitrust law, primarily the Sherman Act.88 It originated in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.89 In Noerr,
forty-one Pennsylvania truck operators alleged that railroads operating in
Pennsylvania had conducted a publicity campaign to influence Pennsylvania
legislators to impose regulations on the trucking industry that would render
truckers unable to compete effectively against the railroads for long-distance
freight-hauling business.9" The truck operators contended that this publicity
campaign violated the Sherman Act.9 1 The Court held that the motive of
the railroads was irrelevant to whether their petitioning activity was a
Sherman Act violation: "The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing
so."92 The Noerr rule appeared to extend to petitioning activity an absolute
immunity from the Sherman Act.
The Noerr Court, however, also suggested that some petitioning activity
may fall within an exception to this absolute immunity: "There may be
situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would
be justified."93 This exception to the absolute immunity from the Sherman
Act, extended to petitioning activity by the Noerr rule, became known as the
"sham" exception.94
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, the Court affirmed
the Noerr rule.95 In Pennington, several large coal companies and the coal
workers' union had conspired to influence the passage of a minimum wage
bill that was specifically designed to make it difficult for small coal
companies to compete.96 Because the spot market was exempt from the
minimum wage legislation, the large companies and the union also had
conspired to get the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a government

87. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 24-25.
88. Id. at 24.

89. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
90. Id. at 129-30.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 129.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 144.
See id.

95. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
96. Id. at 660.
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agency, to curtail its spot market purchases. 97 The small coal companies
argued that these activities violated the Sherman Act. 98 The Court strongly

endorsed the rule it had articulated in Noerr. 99
Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose....

Joint efforts to

influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself

violative of the Sherman Act.1 °

The sham exception was not invoked by the Court again until 1972. In
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,'' a group of

trucking companies, Trucking Unlimited, alleged that a competing group of
trucking companies, California Motor Transport, had attempted to defeat its
applications for state operating licenses by instituting state and federal
proceedings against it."° Trucking Unlimited alleged that California Motor
Transport violated the antitrust laws when it "sought to bar their competitors
from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals.' ' 3 The Court remanded
the case, overturning a lower court dismissal, and held that petitioning
activity is a sham, and is not immune from the Sherman Act, when "the
administrative and judicial processes have been abused . . ., effectively

barring... [a competitor] from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar
as the administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind
cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'political
expression. ""'
After California Motor Transport, the sham exception
appeared to exempt from Noerr immunity petitioning activity aimed, not at
influencing government action, but at barring the petitioning activity of a
competitor.
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court

expressly defined the sham exception for the first time." 5 The express
definition made clear that the sham exception does not require that the
petitioning activity be aimed at barring the petitioning activity of a

97. Id. at 660-61.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 670.
Id.
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 509, 511-12.
Id. at 513.
499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
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competitor.'" In Omni, a billboard company that controlled over ninety-five
percent of the market in Columbia, South Carolina, used its influence over
city officials to persuade the City to pass zoning ordinances restricting the
construction of new billboards." 7 These zoning ordinances protected the
billboard company's almost monopolistic share of Columbia's billboard
business from the inroads of competitors."8 One competitor brought an
antitrust action under the Sherman Act."° The Court held that the billboard company's petitioning activity was protected."' For the first time,
the Court expressly defined the "sham" exception."' The court stated that
"[t]he 'sham' exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons
use the governmental process - as opposed to the outcome of that process
- as an anticompetitive weapon."'" 2 After Omni, the Noerr rule appears
to extend absolute immunity from the Sherman Act to petitioning activity as
long as the activity is aimed at governmental outcome and not governmental
process.
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries,Inc.,'' the Court refined the test for identifying sham petitioning
activity that is excluded from Noerr-Penningtonimmunity."4 In Columbia
Pictures, a group of resort hotel operators rented movie videos to hotel guests
who then could play the videos on equipment located in their rooms."'
Columbia Pictures and several other movie studios owned the copyrights to
the rented videos." 6
The studios competed directly with the hotel
operators' video-rental businesses by offering a cable system designed to
transmit the same movies directly to hotel rooms." 7 The studios sued the
hotel operators for copyright infringement, and the hotel operators counterclaimed that the studios violated the Sherman Act." The Court held that
the studios' petitioning activity, specifically the filing of the copyright
infringement suit, was immune from the Sherman Act under the NoerrPennington doctrine.19
In refusing to apply the sham exception to the studios' infringement suit,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 380.
Id.
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 51-52.

116. Id. at 52.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at62.

SLAPPS

1997]

the Court held that the sham doctrine may be applied only when the
Therefore, the Court
petitioning activity is objectively meritless.'2 z
fashioned a two-tiered test for the sham exception. 2 ' The first inquiry is
whether the activity is objectively meritless.' 22 Petitioning activity is
objectively meritless when no reasonable, objective person could realistically23
expect the activity to succeed in eliciting favorable government action.1
If the petitioning activity is objectively meritless, the second inquiry is
whether the petitioner subjectively intended to use the governmental process,
not the outcome, purely as "an anticompetitive weapon."'2 4 After Columbia Pictures, it is clear that the sham exception is limited to petitioning
intended solely to
activity that is both objectively meritless and subjectively
25
interfere with a competitor's business relationships.
The argument, which is gaining wide acceptance in the SLAPP
literature 26 and the lower courts, 12 7 that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
should apply generally beyond antitrust to confer an absolute immunity upon
petitioning activity in any context when the activity is not a sham, rests
primarily on bases grounded in two Supreme Court cases. The first basis is
a mere fragment in Columbia Pictures. It is the phrase: "invoking ...
[Noerr] in other contexts.' 28 This is a slim reed on which to rest the
application of a new doctrine as the general rule for a First Amendment right.
The second and more substantial basis for this argument is the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in a case that had no antitrust
implications, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 129 In Claiborne, the
NAACP and other concerned groups and individuals presented the local
officials of Claiborne County, Mississippi, with a petition. 30 The petition
demanded concerted action from the local officials and employers to
ameliorate what the petitioners perceived to be pervasive segregation and
inequality of economic opportunity in the county.' 3' The requested action
32
was not forthcoming, so the petitioners boycotted local white merchants.
A few overzealous boycott supporters enforced African-American compliance

120. Id. at 60.

121. Id. at 61.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 60-61 (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
380 (1991)).
125. Id.
PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 28.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
Columbia Pictures,508 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 899.
Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 900.
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with the boycott through the use of threats, intimidation, and violence.' 33
Seventeen local businesses that had been boycotted filed a businessinterference
SLAPP against the NAACP and the other groups involved in the
34
boycott.1
The ClaiborneCourt held that the boycott was a protected activity under
the First Amendment. 35 In discussing this decision, Pring and Canan
declared that, "the Court torched the Claiborne SLAPP, holding that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied and protected indirect petitioning of
government through boycotts of private businesses."' 136 Referring to the
few overzealous petitioners who had used violence to enforce compliance
with the boycott, they claimed that "[t]he Court even excused violence by the
petitioners. 137
To say the Court "excused" the violence seriously misinterprets the
Claiborne holding on the Court's willingness to confer upon all expressions
that implicate the Petition Clause absolute immunity from state tort law. The
Court carefully emphasized that "[t]he First Amendment does not protect
violence."' 38 It expressly limited First Amendment protection to only "the
nonviolent elements" of the boycott. 139 The Court stated that a State could
impose tort liability for the consequences of the violence, which otherwise
is constitutionally unprotected, but that this liability must be imposed with
"precision" to avoid the imposition of liability for the consequences of
nonviolent activity that is otherwise constitutionally protected. 4 ° The
Court stated that state tort liability may be imposed with "careful limitation"
to "accommodate state law with ... important First Amendment interests."''
This careful accommodation of state tort law is at the heart of the
Claiborne Court's failure to support a wholesale extension of the NoerrPennington doctrine. Far from authorizing an absolute immunity, the Court
excised with surgical precision the activities that are protected by the Petition
Clause. Similarly, the Court in New York Times carved out a limited area of
false defamatory speech for First Amendment protection, which like violence,
up until that time, had been otherwise constitutionally unprotected. 42
Before New York Times, the First Amendment extended no protection to false

133. Claiborne,458 U.S. at 905-06.
134. Id. at 889-90.
135. Id. at 915.
136. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 25-26.
137. Id. at 26.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Claiborne,458 U.S. at 916.
Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
Id.at 916.
Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
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defamatory speech. 43 Just as the "[t]he First Amendment does not protect
violence,"'" so "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection." 4 ' In New York imes, however, the Court stated,
"Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate . ...

The First

Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters."'6
The "some falsehood" 14 7 that New York imes protected was the
defamatory statement that is not made with actual malice, or in other words,
the defamatory statement that is not made "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."1 48 Beyond this
limited area of protection, all residual false defamatory statements remain,
like violence, without constitutional protection from the imposition of state
tort liability.

49

"'[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement

made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional

protection."""15
The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to extend absolute immunity
from tort liability to defamation defendants when the allegedly defamatory
speech relates to a matter of public concern and stated,' 5' "'That speech
is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it under the
protective mantle of the Constitution.' ,,"2

In McDonald, the Supreme

Court expressly rejected the argument that speech that implicates the right to
petition is absolutely immune from state defamation law while speech that
implicates the right of free speech is subject to the New York imes balance
of rights:
To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the
Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition
Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and
democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and
assemble. The First Amendment rights are inseparable and there is
no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition ...

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

than [is granted to] other First

FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 241-42.
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 916.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 487 (1985).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75).
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153
Amendment expressions.

As Justice Brennan observed, it is often difficult to extricate the
protection of the right to petition from other protections under the other First
Amendment.15 4 If the right to petition, alone among the First Amendment
rights, conferred absolute immunity from state tort law, the congruence of all
the First Amendment rights would often result in somewhat arbitrary
distinctions: "Expression falling within the Petition Clause will ...
frequently also be protected by the First Amendment freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly."1 55 Furthermore, such a distinction between First
Amendment rights violates "the essential unity of the First Amendment
56
guarantees":1
"It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in
speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They
. . . and therefore are united in the First Article's
are cognate rights,
57
assurance."1
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court explained that, in defamation
cases in which the allegedly defamatory statement relates to a matter of
public concern, the First Amendment freedom of speech "is, however, not the
only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have embraced long
ago the view that [defamation defendants when the allegedly defamatory
statement relates to a matter of public concern] ... enjoy an unconditional
and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation."' 8 The Court
continued:

153. Id. at 485 (citations omitted). In McDonald, the respondent, Smith, was a candidate
for appointment to the position of U.S. Attorney in North Carolina. Id. at 480. The
defendant, McDonald, wrote two letters to the President, who was responsible for making the
appointment, and sent copies of the letters to several other top federal officials. Id. at 481.
The letters falsely accused Smith of civil rights violations, professional ethics violations, fraud,
conspiracy to commit fraud, extortion, and blackmail. Id. at 479. When the President
appointed someone else to the job, Smith sued McDonald for libel. Id. at 480-81. The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court denials of McDonald's motions for judgment on the
pleadings and remanded the case for consideration consistent with the New York Times actual
malice standard. Id. at 481-82, 485. "The right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit
libel with impunity is not." Id. at 485.
154. Id. at 488 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)).

158. 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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[T]he New York limes privilege... [is not] justified solely by
reference to the interest of ... [defamation defendants] in immunity
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York limes rule
states an accommodation between this concern and the limited state
interest present in the context of libel actions [when the allegedly
defamatory statement relates to a matter of public concern] .... "9
Claiborne, therefore, does not support a wholesale application of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine to defamation cases in which the allegedly
defamatory statement implicates the Petition Clause."6 Claiborne is, in
fact, consistent with New York imes and McDonald in holding that First
Amendment protection is not absolute. 1 61 In all these cases, the Court has
carefully, and consistently, accommodated the defamation plaintiff's right to
petition by precisely conferring immunity to only so much of the defendant's
expression that has constitutional value, leaving liability for the residual to
state tort law. 62
Although there is scant Supreme Court doctrinal support for greater
protection for the right to petition than for other First Amendment rights, the
protections of the federal Constitution are only the minimum protection that
states may offer. 63 States are free to offer greater protection to defendants.' 6 States may not, however, offer greater
protection to defendants
165
petition.
to
right
plaintiffs'
of
expense
the
at
The right of defamation plaintiffs to petition includes the right of access
to the courts."6 The importance of the right to protect one's reputation
from being falsely maligned also has been affirmed. 167 The Supreme Court

159. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
160. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 916.
161. Id.
162. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484; Claiborne,458 U.S. at 916; New York Times, 376 U.S.
254 at 279-80.

163. Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Colo. 1984).
164. See id. at 1366.

165. See id. at 1365.
166. See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 ("[F]iling a complaint in court is a form of petitioning
activity."); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
("The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition."); United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
167. The Supreme Court has affirmed that, in a civilized society, each person has an
important, cognizable interest in the protection of his or her reputation from false maligning
statements. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1990); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 341; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
In Rosenblatt, Justice Brennan wrote that "[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest
in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. Justice
Stewart emphasized that
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has recognized that the New York limes balance of rights is already weighted
heavily in the defendant's favor. In Gertz, the Court stated, "This standard
... exacts a .. . high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood.
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to
injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York limes
test."'
The fact that the New York limes balance is heavily weighted in the
defendant's favor is borne out in actual cases. Under the New York limes
balance, defamation plaintiffs have succeeded less than 10% of the time."6
In about 75% of defamation suits, defendants win on pretrial motions for
do win judgments, they
dismissal or summary judgment. 170 When plaintiffs
17 1
time.
the
of
70%
appeal
on
overturned
are
State anti-SLAPP laws that tip the balance even further in favor of
defamation defendants, who presently prevail most of the time, 7 1 may run
afoul of the federal minimum for the protection of plaintiffs' right to petition.
Tellingly, in the Pring/Canan Study, only a single factor was statistically
related to defendants' success in the cases studied: the invocation of the
Petition Clause as a defense.' 73 Once a defendant invoked the Petition
Clause, his or her chances of prevailing approximately doubled. 7 4 In those
cases in which the Petition Clause was raised as a defense, defendants
prevailed almost always. 175 The study found:

[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion
and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being - a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty. The protection of private personality ...is [not] entitled to any less
recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.
Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart referred to "[t]he protection of private
personality" as a "right." Id. Rosenblatt has been quoted with approval repeatedly by the
Court, reaffirming the importance of the protection of private reputation. See, e.g., Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 7; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 324.
168. 418 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added).
169. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 336.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 339. Franklin and Anderson point out that "[tlhis 70 percent reversal rate is
substantially higher than for civil litigation generally." Id.
172. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
173. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218.
174. Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 13. Defendants won 57% of the cases in which they
failed to raise the Petition Clause as a defense and 92% of the cases in which they did. Id.
175. The researchers stated that most of the cases in which the defendant did not win were
cases where the defendant "g[a]ve up and enter[ed] into a settlement." PRING & CANAN,
supra note 3, at 218; see also Pring & Canan, supra note 13, at 12. Because a settlement is
not necessarily a win or a loss for either party, the 92% rate for defendant victories can be
characterized fairly as "just about always." See supra note 174.
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[the defendants] won regardless of the branch or level of government
petitioned, the nature of their petitioning activities and communications, ... the substantive basis of the dispute [underlying their
petitioning activities,] . . . [the] court level, [the] number of claims
[in the complaint], [the] amount of damages
demanded, or [the] time
176
elapsed between filing and disposition.
The almost complete success of the Petition Clause defense suggests that
most lower courts are accepting the argument that, when the Petition Clause
is implicated,
the First Amendment offers absolute immunity, whereas, when
"just ' ' 177 the right of free speech is implicated, the First Amendment offers
7
only an immunity qualified by the New York Times balance of rights. 1
As long as lower courts continue to interpret uncertainty in this area as
an invitation to choose between the New York Times and the NoerrPennington doctrines, this "doctrinal choice"'179 will inevitably push those
courts, which are influenced by defendants' lawyers and the siren song of
popular approval, to apply the allegedly more protective Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to an ever-expanding range of factual situations. This doctrinal
choice appears to offer an end run around the New York Times balance of
rights. However, just as the Supreme Court has refused to allow plaintiffs,

176. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 218.
177. Id. at 13. Pring and Canan suggests that lawyers "avoid malpractice" by employing
a "strategy" of invoking the Petition Clause "rather than just Free Speech." Id. at 15
(emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. I1l. 1990); Sierra
Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District
Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981); cf Florida
Fern Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1993). In FloridaFern Growers, the court, referring to the Pring/Canan Study, declined
to jump on the SLAPP bandwagon. See id. at 570. The court rejected the argument that the
right to petition, alone among the First Amendment rights, confers absolute immunity from
state tort liability and stated:
We are aware of the Concerned Citizens of Putnam County's argument that the
present lawsuit reflects a standard tactic in environmental litigation ....
Appellees
argue that the very pendency of such lawsuits as the instant one would have a chilling effect on First Amendment activity. However, extending absolute immunity to
such activities would seem to extend to these activities a broader protection than the
Constitution itself guarantees. Florida's Constitution provides that persons "shall be
responsible for the abuse" of their free speech rights. Further, . . . [Florida's]
Constitution provides that the courts shall be "open to every person for redress of
any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." To
extend absolute immunity to appelleesfor their activity in the instant case would be
to deny appellant its access to the courts. This we will not do.
Id. at 570 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
179. Waldman, supra note 9, at 1025-26 (emphasis added).
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by choosing a cause of action other than defamation, to make an end run
around the New York Times balance of rights doctine, s° the Court is not
likely to allow defendants, by choosing the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, to do
the same thing.
Everyone loves to hate SLAPPs.S 1 The popularity of antiSLAPP
rhetoric presents the danger that legislators and courts will overreact to the
perceived threat posed by SLAPPs.182 Legislative or judicial denunciations
of SLAPPs win accolades for upholding democratic ideals, home rule, and
the Constitution - accolades from everyone except the defamation plaintiff
who has been deemed a SLAPP plaintiff. Few political trade-offs are so
attractively one-sided.
"SLAPP" - Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation - is, both
on its face and as discussed in the literature, a pejorative term that vilifies the
motives of the plaintiff and idealizes the motives of the defendant. The onesidedness of this presentation raises the specter of the tyranny of a zealous
majority over the hapless plaintiff who is despised because that plaintiff's
case happens to resemble the paradigm SLAPP. The Supreme Court,
however, has long protected the rights of the despised against popular zeal:
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."' 83 Therefore, any legislative or judicial shift of the New York Times balance of rights in favor of
defendants, when that balance may already be weighted heavily in favor of
defendants, is not likely to survive constitutional scrutiny.

180. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). The plaintiff in the original
lawsuit, televangelist Jerry Falwell, claimed damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress as well as for defamation. Id. at 47-48. In a lower court, the jury found for the
defendant on the defamation claim, but awarded damages on the claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 48. The Supreme Court held that there is no choice of
torts that will avoid New York Times when the actual malice standard is squarely applicable
to the facts of a case. Id. at 56. The Court reversed the damages award for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the New York Times
actual malice standard for defamation. Id. at 56-57.
181. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 189. "Finally, an issue on which Republicans and
Democrats, conservatives and liberals, presidents and legislators, attorneys general and local
government lawyers can all agree: SLAPPs ...must be stopped." Id. Pring and Canan even
complained that it has become so popular to hate SLAPPs that they fear losing exclusive
control over the definition of the term they had coined: "Everyone, it seems, wants to stretch
the definition of 'SLAPPs' to fit a particular case or cause." Id. at 228 n.49.
182. See, for example, criticism of California's antiSLAPP statute, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16 (West Supp. 1993), as "a legislative overreaction that creates a 'chilling effect' on
the exercise of ...[plaintiffs'] right of access to the courts." Glover & Jimison, supra note
9, at 141.
183. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).

1997]

SLAPPS

IV.

CONCLUSION

The exercise of First Amendment rights is significantly chilled for
defamation defendants by the considerable time and expense involved in
litigating defamation suits that, in the vast majority of cases, are dismissed
at the very first trial court appearance. The continued use of the term
"SLAPP," however, in the analysis of this problem and in the search for
solutions, inappropriately imposes limitations on the debate that are
idiosyncratic to the original Pring/Canan Study. Although based on
conclusions that may have been inadequately supported, these limitations
have won wide acceptance because they "package" a messy, seemingly
intractable, problem, that is, the chilling effect of defamation suits in general
on all First Amendment rights, into a problem that appears to be more
manageable, that is, the chilling effect of defamation suits only on the right
to petition. Accepting this more manageable problem, some commentators
and state courts have been willing to tidily discard altogether the troublesome
rights of defamation plaintiffs. 18
'
This tidy solution is unlikely to pass
constitutional muster.
The "SLAPP package" apparently is more manageable, and the pervasive
use of the paradigm case in SLAPP literature has inspired a popular outrage
that contributes to the media's focus on allegations that a SLAPP subcategory
of defamation cases exists and is pervasive.'8 5 These allegations remain
largely a matter of speculation. Regardless of the attractiveness of the
"SLAPP packaging," it is time to remove the inadequately supported
limitations that have been imposed on the defamation debate by use the term
"SLAPP." Removal of these suspect limitations will free commentators to
define the true dimensions of the problem of balancing the constitutional
rights of defamation plaintiffs against those of defamation defendants.
For some legislators, a more comprehensive definition of the problem
may take the wind out of their sails. The issue will not be, as it has been,
an easy and gratifying fight against an evil that everyone loves to hate"
- meritless8 7 "attacks on citizens and the democratic process."' 8 A

184. See generally Sills, supra note 4, at 547. Several states, having held hearings on the
SLAPP phenomenon, have passed legislation to combat SLAPPs. ld. at 578. Among actions
considered or taken, these state legislatures have adopted broader definitions of parties and
activities, id. at 579, counteraction provisions, id., actual malice standards, id. at 580, prefiling
hurdles, id. at 585, absolute immunity for both private and public officials, id. at 587, and
lower judicial standards for dismissing suits, id. at 588.
185. See Abell, supra note 4, at 96 n.7.
186. PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 189.
187. SLAPPs are meritless by express definition. Pring, supra note 1, at 8; see PRING &
CANAN, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Gordon v. Marrone, 155 Misc. 2d 726, 736 (1992)
(defining SLAPPs as suits "without substantial merit" in what Pring and Canan call "perhaps
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more comprehensive definition of the problem may make remedial legislation
more difficult to propose and pass. It will, however, make the legislation
that is proposed and passed more useful.
The best solutions will significantly reduce the amount of time and
money that it takes to litigate defamation claims under the New York imes
actual malice standard. To pass constitutional muster, however, these
solutions must not tip the balance of rights struck by the Supreme Court, as
embodied in New York Times 89 and its progeny, any further in favor of
defamation defendants. Constitutionally viable solutions will include in the
balance not only the constitutional rights of the defamation defendant, but
also the defamation plaintiff's right to seek redress in the courts for wrongful
reputational injury not only when the defendant's right of free speech is
implicated, but also when the defendant's right to petition is implicated.

the best description of SLAPPs")); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
188. PRiNG & CANAN, supra note 3, at 187.
189. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

